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My aim in this paper is to provide an account of the ways in which meta-narratives 
and master concepts lead to problematic theoretical outcomes. To carry out my analysis I 
will focus on three pieces of scholarship: Michael Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s (2000) 
Preface and First Chapter of Empire; Ulrich Beck´s (1999) World Risk Society as 
Cosmopolitan Society?: Ecological Questions in a Framework of Manufactured 
Uncertainties; and Barry Buzan’s and Mathias Albert’s (2010) Differentiation: A 
sociological approach to international relations theory. Specifically, in this paper I argue 
that the afore-mentioned pieces can be related in one specific manner: they all contain 
totalizing tendencies based on inescapable logics which lead to the silencing of the histories 
and realities of voices alien to their central narratives/concepts and the historical lineage of 
their knowledge practices. In this sense my approach should be taken as a critique of meta-
narratives and master concepts as much as it is an argument about the specific contents of 
each individual work.  It should be noted, however, that given the complexity of the articles 
analyzed here and the length of this paper, my critique will be limited to the most 
problematic aspects of each text. This, however, ought not to be interpreted as a statement 
about the intellectual worth of these pieces or the generality of their content. I believe that 
all of them constitute excellent pieces of scholarship that deserve further analysis and 
attention.   
This paper is organized in the following way. First I deal with Hardt’s and Negri’s 
Empire; the second section of the paper focuses on Beck´s World Risk Society; the third 
main section of this paper tackles the functional differentiation argument posed by Buzan 
and Albert. By way of conclusion, the final section of this paper briefly discusses 
alternatives to grand-narratives and master concepts.  To illustrate one such alternative I 
briefly discuss Vendulka Kubálková’s (2000) International Political Theology approach.  In 
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this section I contend that Kubálková’s approach provides a degree of flexibility and 
limitedness that enable it to escape some of the totalizing and silencing tendencies of the 
main pieces analyzed in this paper.  
 
The Omnipresent and Resonant Voice of Empire  
Empire is a complex and thorough academic accomplishment. No doubt. It seeks 
through an analysis of (post) modernity, power, class and politics to show that the 
contemporary world is a world of Empire – not imperialism, Empire. Empire is a force (a 
new form of sovereignty, a world order) that operates without a centre of power. Like 
Foucault’s notion of power, the power of Empire does not rest in the hands of anyone state, 
individual, institution or group. Empire is a new world order that goes beyond the nation-
state and the age of imperialism.  An important feature of Empire is that it is imbued with  
biopolitical power which runs through the bodies of people and its field of operation, as 
Hardt and Negri put it is “life itself.”  
Overall Hardt’s and Negri’s their work can be characterized as a Marxist-
Foucauldian analysis of power and advanced capitalism.  However eclectic its theoretical 
sources may be Empire it can be said that Empire is a work of leftist politics that, at some 
point in its genealogy is heavily rooted in Marxism (after all Negri is a convinced Marxist 
activist and academic).  The concept of Empire offers, among many other things, a sense of 
the deep problems in contemporary modernity (or postmodernity). More importantly, 
Empire offers a view of international power which is sweeping and hard to ignore. 
Considering this it would be pertinent to ask: Can Empire be escaped?  
My contention here is that Empire cannot be escaped and is therefore a not only a 
limited analytical tool. The concept of Empire that Negri and Hardt embrace is rooted in a 
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totalizing sense of history, subjects and structures. Their analysis, furthermore, leads to 
silencing: silencing of voices outside Empire and voices that cannot found a voice within it. 
In this sense and even though Hardt and Negri are eager to explain that Empire and a theory 
of Empire are not to be equated with the concept and theory(ies) of imperialism, it is 
difficult to not to think of their own project as being, in a small (and however unintended) 
but significant sense as intellectually imperialistic.  The fact that Hard and Negri come 
from the political left does little to dissipate similarities with other efforts from the right at 
compartmentalizing world experience, like, for instance, Samuel Hungtinton´s Clash of 
Civilizations.  
The sense of totality that is found in Empire is not inconspicuous.  The Foucauldian 
logic of biopower is taken to its limits, and the empirical examples used to illustrate it and 
exemplify its forces must largely be taken on a leap of faith. The field of biopolitical power 
according to Hard and Negri constitutes “life itself.”  While it is not entirely clear what they 
mean by “life itself”, it is far from clear how the biopolitical can be a constitutive element 
of the whole of human life. Because little evidence is provided to sustain their claims one 
must only wonder how at the level of method they perceive and capture the biopolitical. 
Hard and Negri are admittedly critical of the limits of biopower and of purely discursive 
approaches. However, their answer, bringing-Marxism-back-in, does little to dispel the 
questions posed above. Ultimately, and important problem of Empire is that it takes the 
notion of biopolitics too far.  
Hardt’s and Negri’s method of making compatible Foucauldian philosophy with 
Marxist analysis is rather underspecified. The discussion of Deleuze, Guttari and Italian 
neo-Marxists in relation to the “real dynamics of production” and “mass intellectuality” and 
/or “immaterial labor” introduced on pages 28 and 29 does little to dispel the far reaching 
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consequences of extending the notion of biopower to the entire world (ignoring of course 
Foucault’s historically and spatially rooted analyses of biopower).  The power implications 
of Empire, at least theoretically, cannot be escaped with the introduction of neo-Marxist 
approaches, or at least not insofar as the biopolitical is one of the dominant forms of power 
in Empire.  Their very brief discussion of how through a new theory of value we can reach 
a new theory of subjectivity is rather limited. There is no definition of subjectivity and no 
discussion of its constitutive parts; no discussion of the history of the subject, its ontology 
and its relationship to the “outside” world. It must be noted that Foucault´s biopower and 
discursive power can be useful tools of analysis if and when applied to restricted historical 
and empirical spaces (as Foucault did); however, if taken to the global/universal scale, their 
limits are hard, if not impossible to establish.  In this sense Empire is a totalizing force.  
Empire is also totalizing, however, because it does not establish clear 
methodological grounds on which empirical evidence can be judged. One must remember 
that Hardt and Negri do not talk about an Empire as a discursive formation. According to 
the authors an Empire is out there, it is material, and it is real. In this sense, empirical 
observations of Empire are crucial in order to determine its existence.  However, the 
theoretical and methodological basis of Empire provides no such grounds. In fact its 
method and theory are rather open ended. Ultimately, even the very writing of this paper or 
the World Cup of Soccer can be interpreted as manifestations of Empire. It could be 
argued, thus, that the reason Hardt and Negri provide no such methodological basis is 
because the logic of Empire and its relationship to biopolitics has no clear limits. Hence, no 
methodological solid ground on which to make claims about the “outside” world (about 
Empire) can be provided.  
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The totalizing force of Empire can be interpreted as an exercise of silencing. 
Despite rhetorical claims to the contrary, a concrete philosophical and theoretical basis for 
local struggles and every day forms of resistance (cf, Scott, 1985) are difficult to find in 
Empire (or at least in its first chapter). The only possible basis for struggle relates to a 
rather traditional Marxist analysis of class, labour and production in which politics of 
identity, spirituality (cf. Kubalkoba, 2000), gender and so on are difficult to justify.  As 
mentioned above, the theoretical identity of Empire is restrictive because it is too open 
ended. It is at once difficult to find spaces for subjectivity and politics at the local level, and 
separate localized forms of resistance from the logic of Empire. What is clear is that 
categories such as immaterial labour are not universally valid and therefore not applicable 
to the realities of identity struggles of indigenous peoples or religious communities. I would 
argue that Empire offers no solution to the problems left by either Foucault or Marx, even 
though it seeks to offer a grand theory of global order that operates without an operator and 
that is ultimately rooted in labour and production. Empire, thus, speaks for the world and in 
doing so silences a big part of it.    
 
Who is at Risk? Ulrich Beck and the World Risk Society  
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper parallels can be drawn between Negri 
and Hard and Beck. Beck, like Hardt and Negri writes a world-wide tale. Beck’s story, not 
unlike Hard’s  and Negri´s is not necessarily uplifting. Beck´s approach relates to Hardt’s 
and Negri’s to each other by the presence of an inescapable logic that silences and totalizes 
the wealth of human experience(es). In the case of Beck the logic that brings the world 
together is World Risk Society.  Beck’s scholarly contribution is no doubt important. 
Clearly, some of the potential dangers risks engendered by modern industrial societies, their 
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patterns and logic of production, institutions as well as their technologies are in a sense 
global and concern us all. Risk can be unifying in a global scale, Earth Hour being a good 
example of this. But is risk as important? Is risk the defining characteristic of a presumed 
world society?   Who is at risk? Who is perceiving risk?   
For Beck, the question of risk, ultimately brings a sense of unification to the life of 
the world’s populations. Risk, its manufacturing and its management are for Beck an 
immanent component of the reality of the modern world. Risk in today’s world is 
fundamentally different from previous epochs. Contemporary risk is global. Climate change 
and nuclear disasters know no borders.  The risk of terrorism and the use of chemical and 
biological weapons are also a global and deterritorialized.  Risk, that is the perception of  
potential harm is everywhere. Like power for Hardt and Negri, risk, for Beck, is a 
fundamental component in today’s world. But unlike Hardt’s and Negri’s notion of Empire 
which does not necessitate of individual minds to apprehend the reality of Empire, Beck’s 
risk society necessitates of subjects that understand, evaluate and are concerned with risk. 
In this sense Beck assumes a predefined subject that cares about risk. In this sense Beck 
presents an argument in which at the moment of perception risk is the same for everyone. 
But where is risk? Is it in the minds of people? How does Beck’s concept of risk bring 
together the materiality of say Chernobyl and the disourse that creates risk? 
 The answers are not entirely clear. Like in Empire one finds in Beck’s World Risk 
Society an amalgam of theoretical and philosophical approaches. Beck’s analysis seems to 
be rooted in a combination of small doses of postructuralism, a scent of Marxism and a big 
portion of Kantian-like philosophical principles. And ultimately it is hard to evaluate which 
of these views prevails.  At once risk is constructed by discourse and perceived by the 
mind. Whose mind is perceiving risk? Is it the mind of the transcendental 
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subject/individual? Are there histories defining the perceiving subject? Why, why not? Is 
risk dependent on an ahistorical mind that apprehends it because it is “real”? Does culture 
mediate physical risks and our perception of them? Why? Why not? Beck offers no 
response to these questions. Instead he offers an account of the production of risk, of its 
constitutive discourses and its material sources. The other end of the risk-society namely 
people, are largely left untheorized.  Theorizing about those perceiving risk is important.  Is 
the perception of the risk of environmental disaster the same for those living in the slums of 
Mumbai or Rio than it is for those living in a suburb in Ottawa? In other words, while the 
risk of a nuclear explosion, or climate change is in a sense ‘global,’ the notion of risk, its 
appreciation, consequences, comprehension and response is by no means “global” and, 
therefore, it is not a cosmopolitan theory of risk that will address these issues.  What will 
the risk of a nuclear blast mean for a group of disenfranchised gang members in Central 
America whose day-to-day lives is defined not by risk but by witnessing actual death? 
But how is this approach totalizing and silencing? First an most obviously, it is 
totalizing because risk is portrayed as being everywhere and it is ultimately the same for 
everyone.  Risk is defined in terms of its relationship to modernity but not all societies 
experience modernity in the same fashion. Modernity is not monolithic. Beck’s focus on 
modernity is problematic insofar as it silences risks that do not correspond his particular 
understanding of the relationship between risk and the contemporary world. The risk of 
racism, elitism, patriarchy, gang-related deaths, which are more prominent in developing 
areas are put in the back burner by Beck’s analysis (although he does mention the issue of 
risk and poverty). A feminist account of climate change for example reveals the limitation 
Beck’s analysis. According to feminists for example, climate change is real and we must all 
care about its implications. But climate change cannot be thought of independently of 
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gender. Climate change adaptation and mitigation has real gender implications – men and 
women will be affected differently by climate change.  In other words, what feminists tell 
us is that portraying something as “global” based on the physical scale of its consequences 
risks portraying other, less visible, risks as less important. Moreover, beck’s notion of risk 
also underplays (or silences) the concrete and real suffering, of vast numbers of people due 
to the actual consequences of capitalist expansion into the globe scale. Risk implies 
potential suffering and affliction, but there is a real sense of affliction due to real events like 
oil spills, labour camps, deforestation and so on. The reasons why Beck focuses on risk as 
opposed to real affliction are not clear. 
One could argue that Beck’s shortcoming in this respect is largely due to his limited 
analysis of power. If  Hardt and Negri overstreched “Foucauldian power,” Beck completely 
ignores its implications and its applications.  Power simultaneously hides and reproduces 
itself in dominant discourses. A more thorough analysis of power would have enabled Beck 
to realize that the notion of the “global” has discursive power implications (as shown by the 
example of feminists above). The talk of “Global” necessarily silences the non-global. 
While it is undeniable that climate change is a problem that affects the whole of planet 
earth, one must be ware of how it is portrayed.  Its global implications may entail that other 
“global” problems, like racism, are minimized and portrayed as local because they do not 
have the physical connotations that climate change does. What a Foucauldian analysis of 
power would enable Beck to see is that power hides in discourse, like the discourse of 
“global risk.” In short, speaking of a risk society in terms of its relationship to modernity’s 
(or postmodernity)-induced risks is totalizing and therefore silences the voices of the non-
global, non-modern risks that are as global as climate change or biological weapons.  
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Finally, Beck´s theory is totalizing and silencing in one additional respect: Its 
account of history. While his accounts of contemporary society, the reflexivity of 
modernity and the incalculability of risk are interesting, it is difficult to see how this epoch 
is more of a risk society than say colonial society in Latin America. While Beck would 
counter that colonial society had no climate change or nuclear weapons, mass media, or 
modern institutions, one could argue that the constitutive elements of a risk-society need 
not be defined and limited to such elements. Instead one could as easily posit that the 
production base (slave labour), the colonial structures of rule, the inquisitive power of the 
church produced more of a risk society than the one beck talks about. While the swords and 
disease brought by Spaniards to Latin America were not able to kill hundreds of thousands 
of people in a matter of seconds, like the bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki did, they 
nonetheless managed to exterminate tens of millions of indigenous peoples in a few 
centuries – if that is not a risk society, what is? 
 
A Functional  Circle:  Buzan’s and Albert’s Functional Differentiation and IR 
While the influences of Empire and Beck´s Risk Society differ radically from those 
used by Buzan and Albert, they share the totalizing and silencing effect. Clearly Buzan and 
Albert come from different foundational, theoretical and methodological planes. Their main 
influence, Durkheim (and to a lesser degree Luhmann) and the theory of functional 
differentiation appreciate social forces in a different manner. Nonetheless, their master 
concept of differentiation shares some of the problematic, totalizing tendencies that the 
concepts of Empire and World Risk Society contain.   
Functional differentiation is given a privileged position in Buzan’s and Albert’s 
analysis. Functional differentiation roughly refers to the complex differentiation of units in 
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a functional whole. The notion here is that through an analysis of differentiation one can 
create taxonomies and historical benchmarks upon which to evaluate international relations, 
its history and its contemporary realities. Buzan and Albert argue that bringing this 
sociological approach to IR can help the discipline to anchor its interpretations of 
international relations and the history of international relations under a single, unifying 
logic  
The first problem with Buzan’s and Albert’s call is that any analysis of international 
and domestic society can be potentially subsumed under the logic of functional 
differentiation. Like Hardt’s and Negri’s logic of Empire Buzan and Albert establish no 
discernible methodological limits to the notion of differentiation, and, in particular, to the 
concept of functionality. If a system is understood through the notion of its functionality, 
then any part of the system can be rationalized in terms and in relation to its functionality 
(or disfunctionality) to the system. Moreover, the concept of functional differentiation 
assumes societies (and the international system in the case of Buzan and Albert) to be a 
systemic whole.  However, why is the international world a systemic whole? As it is well 
known, conceiving IR as a system has attracted much criticism. Moreover, as mentioned by 
Buzan and Albert themselves, an approach rooted on functional differentiation is all 
encompassing: it focuses on politics, law religion, economics and so on (Buzan and Albert, 
2010: 325). In other words, the logic of functional differentiation can account for 
everything that is social. Presumably anything, even speech acts can be rationalized 
(normalized?) as an expression, element or component of the big social whole that society 
(whether international or domestic) is supposed to represent.  There is, therefore, a problem 
with the notion of functional differentiation: if pushed far enough it presents no discernable 
conceptual limits in terms of what it can or cannot claim to explain and/or understand. In 
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this sense, the concept and has a tendency to naturalize that which is not natural and 
therefore create a powerful discourse about the inevitability of certain processes, actors and 
institutions.  
A different problem with functional differentiation that leads it to totalizing and 
silencing conclusions is that it is an approach based on the notion of evolutionary history. 
That is, it conceives societies through history according to evolutionary stages of 
complexity and differentiation. According to this theory more primitive social forms evolve 
into more complex ones until they reach functional differentiation. Buzan and Albert (2010: 
319) talk about functional differentiation in IR as either potentially representing the current 
stage of globalization (Ibid: 318).  Globalization, therefore, potentially represents a place 
quite close to the summit of the evolutionary ladder of differentiation.   
As has likely become clear already, the portrayal of an evolutionary ladder can 
come dangerously close to producing an unfounded hierarchization of human experience. 
This portrayal of history also comes close to reproducing the discredited (and 
preoccupying) discourses that modernization theories produced in the past.  Despite 
portraying differentiation as a neutral concept, Buzan and Albert commit to a sense of 
differentiation which is rooted on hierarchy. Take for instance the following quote:  
This [Durkheim’s] is a materialist theory claiming that as the numbers of people in 
a society increases, contact and interaction also increase, and the social structure 
moves from simple and segmentary to a more complex division of labour. As this 
movement occurs, the basis of social solidarity automatically shifts from 
mechanical (collective consciousness) to organic (functional differentiation) … 
This type of thinking is particularly well developed in anthropology, which has 
many cases of failure (social collapse) to consider as well as evolutionary 
successes that move up the differentiation ladder (Buzan and Albert, 2010: 319, 
emphasis added).    
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Clearly, the notion of evolutionary success underlies the concept of functional 
differentiation, and, therefore, Buzan’s and Albert’s argument. At this point one could ask, 
can the current state of globalization be portrayed as a relative evolutionary success? Many, 
especially those at the losing end of globalization would disagree. It is in this sense that one 
can claim Buzan’s and Albert’s argument to be totalizing and silencing.  
 
Conclusion: Theoretical Flexibility and Dialogue  
To conclude I would like to take a moment to discuss possible alternative ways of 
theorizing that move beyond the totalizing and silencing effects of grand narratives and 
master concepts. To argue my point I will briefly engage with the work of Vendulka 
Kubalkoba (2000).  Below I briefly argue that there are at least two crucial factors that 
make Kubalkoba’s piece “Towards and International Political Theology” (2000) evade 
some of the problems with the pieces analyzed above: Kubalkoba’s piece is flexible and 
limited.  
Kubalkoba´s approach, an International Political Theology (IPT) seeks theoretical 
flexibility in that it “has to consider agency, structure, material resources, all connected 
through rules, as an integral part of any analysis” (Kubalkoba, 2000: 689); moreover, IPT 
takes “the ‘linguistic turn’, but … without in the process reducing reality to textuality”; 
moreover, IPT “is expressly post-positivist, but it is not postmodernist. It is not anti-
foundationalist, therefore, noting the utility of empirical social science as a consequence 
(Ibid: 688). 
Kubalkoba´s approach is also limited in its reach. Kubalkoba’s approach escapes the 
sometimes totalizing elements of structuralist and certain sociological approaches. Her 
approach not only gives credence to spiritual, emotional and affective factors, but looks for 
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relationships and asks who is interacting with whom, who is the agent, and what are the 
rules (Ibid: 689). It also looks for context in the situatedness of relationships. 	
While Kubalkoba´s IPT can also be interpreted as a master concept, her sensitivity 
to the effects of grandiloquent theorizing and, above all, her attention to her own 
positioning and the nature of her theory as socially situated lends her work a higher degree 
of flexible openness that the works analyzed above lack.  
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